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Some oil-rich countries suffer from a resource curse, a paradoxical situation in 
which a country with oil wealth has poor economic growth and social development. A 
country can escape the resource curse by selecting appropriate policies. Governments are 
responsible for utilizing the right policies and managing the natural resource revenue 
effectively to benefit their nation.  
In this report, various economic, political, and social measurements are used to 
examine the fall into the resource curse by Nigeria, Iraq, and Brazil for a period of time, 
and the scape of Norway from the resource curse. The report also evaluates the current 
circumstances of Iraq to determine which direction the resource curse will take. Several 
recommendations are presented to direct Iraq out of the resource curse. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE CURSE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Introduction 
The “Natural Resource Curse” is a phenomenon that occurs in some countries that 
receive wealth from oil or other natural resources. These countries are slower in terms of 
economic growth and social development than countries that lack natural resources. 
Countries that rely heavily on the income from natural resource extraction tend to be 
more “economically troubled, socially instable, authoritarian, and conflict ridden” than 
other countries in the world (Sovacool, 2010).  Also, some countries that have natural 
resources still perform poorly, even after many years of resource extraction (Omorogbe, 
2006). 
Various ideas have been proposed to explain how the huge revenue from oil and 
gas affects nations and governments negatively. Studies have examined the relationship 
between resources and wars; some countries have experienced civil wars, such as the 
Sierra Leone civil war over diamonds, while other countries have been invaded, such as 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These are cases where the resources caused trouble and 
conflicts when governments misused the revenue for violence (Le Billon, 2004). 
Conflicts and wars will damage a country’s economy, and eventually the oil will turn into 
a curse, as has happened to Iraq.   
In addition to conflicts and wars, the revenue from natural resources causes a gap 
between rich and poor, creates corruption in institutions, and empowers cruel 
governments to sustain their political power (Karl, 1998: 2005). Thus, what happens as a 
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result of having resources confirms what the founder of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), Juan Pablo Parez Alfonso, believed in 1975: that oil creates 
problems. He stated, “I call petroleum the devil’s excrement” (The Economist, May 22, 
2003). 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are examples of countries that 
perform well in spite of lack of resources. They rely on a solid manufacturing sector; 
their economy is growing rapidly, which proves the inverse of the resource curse.  
In most of the world, the revenue from oil and other resources is managed by the 
government. If it is managed advantageously, this revenue can be a blessing for the 
nations’ citizens. However, when it is managed “opportunistically” for the benefit of the 
elite or among government officials, it will become a curse to the nation and will create a 
fortune for the government (Sovacool, 2010). Norway exemplifies successful revenue 
management by the government. Its leaders utilize the oil money for the development of 
their country and for the benefit of its citizens, not for the governmental elite.  
Ideally, the revenue can be used in long-term programs such as reducing poverty 
and good governance programs for the benefit of nations like Norway; but most oil-
abundant countries such as Nigeria, Iraq, and Angola have conflicts, and corrupt, 
dictatorial regimes that abuse human rights (Humphreys et al. 2007).  
Many factors cause the natural resource curse. Different authors have looked at 
different indications to determine the cause of the curse.  Humphreys et al. (2007), in 
their book, Escaping the Resource Curse, summarized the most important causes: these 
include weak institutions, over-spending of oil revenue, insufficient investment in 
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education, political and economic policy, Dutch Disease, rent-seeking behavior, and 
volatility of oil income (Voss, 2009).  
Dutch Disease results from an economic boom created by natural resource income 
that temporarily over-values the local currency and causes local goods to be less 
competitive. Rent-seeking behavior is the practice of deriving profit from the resources 
without contributing to productivity. Volatility of income from oil is unpredictable 
income because of the oil price change (Voss, 2009). Table 1 explains these three factors. 
Their characteristics confirm if the resource curse is found in any country. 
  Other studies found different measurements that can be used to determine if a 
country is blessed or cursed by its natural resources. These measurements can be 
geological, political, economic, and social. According to Sovacool (2010), geological 
factors include resource availability and political measurements include transparency and 
authorized levels of oil and gas production. Sovacool stated further that economic 
measurements are a combination of exports and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
government revenue, poverty rate, per capita income, and inflation rates. He defined 
social measurements as: education, infant mortality, food security, and life expectancy. 
“Curse” can be measured by examining factors such as decrease of transparency in 
revenue management (when the public is not aware of how their government manages oil 
income), increased corruption caused mostly by lack of transparency, increase in the 
percentage of exports relative to the total amount of oil and gas from total production, 
increased revenue from oil and gas with increased inflation, decrease in per capita 
income, decline in life standards and literacy, as well as a rise in infant mortality and 
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starvation. Table 2 explains the dimensions and the measurements to be observed while 
looking for resource curse in any country. 
 Analyzing political, economic, and social factors through case studies will help 
us understand the theory of the natural resource curse. In the following chapters of this 
report, three oil-rich countries Norway, Nigeria, and Brazil are analyzed to determine 
whether they faced or escaped the resource curse. Norway, by using its oil revenue 
efficiently, has escaped the resource curse, whereas Nigeria has fallen into the resource 
curse.  Brazil faced a resource curse from the 1960’s to 1980’s, but after that Brazil 
started to escape the curse and grow economically. Due to new oil discoveries in 
November 2007, Brazil might face a resource curse again, but the government is 
implementing new strategies like Norway’s and is willing to face the challenges to escape 
the resource curse.  
These case studies are used to describe the situation in Iraq. Like Nigeria, Iraq has 
been a victim of the natural resource curse. It started during Saddam Hussein’s rule in 
1979. The country experienced wars, poverty, and sanctions until 2003, when Hussein’s 
rule ended.  After 2003, Iraq remained in the resource curse, and it may face another 
curse, like Brazil did, if the government is not willing to face the challenges and 






Table 1: Definitions and characteristics of natural resource curse causes. 
 
Source: modified from Voss, 2009.
Cause Definition Characteristic 
Dutch 
Disease 
An energy boom from an increase in 
oil prices or a large oil discovery that 
results in a temporary overvaluation of 
local currency, making domestically 
produced manufactured goods less 
competitive 
 Increase in the resource sector and concurrent 
decrease in the tradable sector  
 Large current account surplus  
 Appreciation in the real exchange rate 
 Import substitution strategy through high 
tariffs or quotas  




An increase in competition over oil 
windfall by public and private agents 
as a result of a large accumulation of 
resource wealth 
 Large expansion of public expenditures 
 Inefficient social projects 
 Resource wealth concentrated in the hands of 
a few  
 Large government subsidies 
 Low taxes 
 High government corruption 




The volatility of oil prices makes oil 
income unpredictable 
 Volatile real exchange rate 
 Volatile oil prices  
 Unstable term trade 
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Table 2: Dimensions and measurements that can be observed for natural resource curse identification. 







Table 2: Dimensions and measurements that can be observed for natural resource curse identification (continued).  
Source: Sovacool, 2010. 
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CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE RESOURCE 
CURSE 
 
This section discusses three case studies from different parts of the world and 
examines whether the oil-rich countries involved are immune to or subject to the resource 
curse. 
2.1 NORWAY 
Norway is a one of the developed countries, located in northern Europe. Norway 
is a Scandinavian country that is bordered by Sweden and Denmark. It has a population 
of 4,691,849. Figure (1) shows a map of Norway and brief facts about the country. 
 





Location: Northern Europe, bordering the North 
Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, west of 
Sweden 
 
Government type: Constitutional monarchy 
Area:  323,802 sq km 
 
Population: 4,691,849 
World population rank 118    
 
Population below poverty line: N/A 
 
Labor force: 2.59 million (2010) 
Infant mortality rate: total: 3.55 deaths/1,000  
live births 
  
Oil reserves: 6.68 billion bbl (2010) 
World oil revenue rank: 21  
 
Oil production: 2.35 million bbl/day (2009) 










2.1.1 RESERVES,  PRODUCTION,  AND EXPORT 
 
Norway has a variety of natural resources; the most noticeable is oil and natural 
gas reserves. Oil was discovered in 1969 and production started in 1971. More reserves 
were discovered in subsequent years; there were 50 producing oil fields in 2008 
(Gardner, 2008). Currently, Norway has the largest oil reserves in Western Europe; on 
January 1, 2010, it had 6.68 billion barrels of proven oil. The oil reserves are located 
offshore on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS).  
Norway’s oil production is continually increasing; oil production was 2.35 million 
bbl/d in 2009. In addition to the wealth created by oil production, export brings a huge 
amount of revenue to the country. Norway was able to sell 90% of its discovered reserves 
in 2008 (Gardner, 2008). In 2009, the estimated export was 2.15 million bbl/d.  Norway 
is considered as the largest exporter in Western Europe. According to the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, the export value is 22% of GDP and 27% of the government’s 
revenue (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2010). Figure 2 illustrates Norway’s 
oil net production, consumption, and export. 
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Figure 2: Norway’s total oil production, consumption, and exports 1999-2009. 
 Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Norway/pdf.pdf 
 
2.1.2 NORWAY’S RESPONSE TO THE RESOURCE CURSE 
 
Oil discovery has made changes in the standard of living and has increased the 
GDP in Norway. Compared to other Scandinavian counties, Norway experienced an 
immediate growth after discovering oil in 1969, growth that has exceeded the growth of 
its neighbors, Sweden and Denmark. Studies show that there was a noticeable change in 
GDP after the oil discovery, as shown in Figure 3, which illustrates this rapid growth 
(Larsen, 2003). According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) website, the 
Norwegian GDP per capita in 2010 was $59,100 (2010 estimates). 
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Figure 3: GDP Per Capita, Scandinavia, 1960-2002. U.S. 1999 Dollars, PPP (Purchasing 
Power, a method for converting real GDP per capita in national currency to US Dollars) 
Source: Larsen, 2003. 
Norway has used its oil to promote its other industries. The discovery of oil 
helped to connect the manufacturing sector and oil.  For instance, shipbuilding is a well-
known industry in Norway, but in the late 1970’s the industry faced significant 
challenges.  The oil industry helped it to survive when the shipyards began to 
manufacture equipment for oil drilling and transportation. This example illustrates a 




Norway has social considerations and follows a policy to benefit its citizens by 
saving money for the future. Health-care expenses and pensions will increase in the 
future, as the population is expected to age rapidly in coming years. In 1990, Norway 
announced a plan for saving a portion of oil revenue for the future.   
Another successful strategy of Norway is its Stabilization of Wealth or Sovereign 
Wealth Fund (SWF), which is the Norwegian government pension fund from oil revenue. 
Many countries depend on SWF for increasing revenue and investment. It is allocating 
some of the revenue from oil to a separate management authority in order to invest in 
higher return assets so as to help in volatile price situations and to diversify the country’s 
investment. SWFs can also be used as stabilization funds to provide short-term budgetary 
support for the state as well as  for activities such as investing in domestic companies 
operating within the country so that they can grow and create more domestic jobs, or 
using the high returns from SWF investments to create social programs (Saevitzon and 
Schmitz, 2008). 
Kern (2007, P.2) defined the Sovereign Wealth Fund as follows:  
Sovereign wealth funds – or state investment funds – are financial 
vehicles owned by states which hold, manage or administer public funds and 
invest them in a wider range of assets of various kinds. Their funds are mainly 
derived from excess liquidity in the public sector stemming from government 
fiscal surpluses or from official reserves at central banks. SWFs can be 
categorized into two types of funds according to their primary purpose. On the 
one hand, so-called stabilization funds aim to even out the budgetary and fiscal 
policies of a country by separating them from short-term budgetary or reserve 
developments which may be caused by price changes in the underlying markets, 
i.e. in oil or minerals, but also in foreign exchange conditions. On the other 
hand, savings or intergenerational funds create a store of wealth for future 
generations by using the assets they are allocated to spread the returns on a 
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country’s natural resources across generations in an equitable manner. Even 
though similar in their purpose and investment behavior to other forms of funds 
– such as pension funds, investment funds and trusts, hedge or private-equity 
funds – SWFs essentially differ from the former as they are not privately owned, 




In addition to the above, Norway has used an excellent strategy of oil revenue 
management to promote economic growth, which is transparency. According to Revenue 
Watch Index, as a measure of transparency, in 2010 Norway ranked second after Brazil 
for making public detailed information about key resources. Norway’s success in 
managing its oil revenue is based on: successful methods of distribution, lack of 
disagreement about the distribution, the use of educated expertise in revenue 
management, the existence of effective political and economic institutions, and an export 
commodity. These factors explain Norway’s sudden increase in growth, its positive use 
of its resources, and its avoidance of rent-seeking behavior (Larsen, 2005). 
By avoiding the negatives of Dutch Disease and rent seeking-behavior, enjoying 
the benefits of transparency as well as conflict- and corruption- free political institutions, 
Norway has escaped the resource curse. It has turned the possession of oil into a blessing 
rather than a curse. 
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2.2 BRAZIL 
Brazil is the largest country in South America. It is bounded by the Atlantic 
Ocean to the east and has a coastline of more than 4,600 miles. It is the world's fifth 
largest country, with a population of 201 million.  Figure 4 shows a map of Brazil and 


















Figure 4: Map of Brazil.  
Source: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/brazil.html 
Location: Eastern South America, 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean 
Government type: Federal Republic 
 
Area:  8,514,877 sq km 
 
Population: 203,429,773 
Global population rank: 5th  
 
Population below poverty line: 26% (2008) 
 
Labor force: 103.6 million (2010 ) 
 
Infant mortality rate: total: 21.86 deaths/ 
1,000 live birth.  
 
Oil reserves: 13.2 billion bbl (2010) 
World oil revenue rank: 17th  
 
Oil Production: 2.572 million bbl/day 
(2009) 






2.2.1 RESERVES, PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
 
Like Norway, Brazil has relied on oil revenue since oil was discovered in 1939. 
Brazil has 12.9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in 2011, the second-largest in South 
America after Venezuela. Oil production has experienced several stages of failure and 
success. Initial production was 2700 barrels per day in 1950, which increased to 2.28 
million barrels per day in 2007. The country’s oil production in 2010 was 2.7 million 
barrels per day (6 percent) higher than in 2009 and reached 2.9 million bbl/d in 2011 
(Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2011). Petrobras, the oil company that 
initiated oil production in Brazil, has suffered from dictatorship and economic problems, 
but it has survived and flourished. It is now the leading exporter and one of the largest 
companies in the country (Puccini, 2009). Exports should rise in the future because of the 
recent pre-salt discoveries that will increase production. According to the Short-Term 
Energy Outlook, net exports will continue through the end of 2012 (Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 2011). Figure 5 illustrates oil production and consumption in 
Brazil from 2002 to 2012. 
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Figure 5: Brazil’s liquid fuels production and consumption 2002-2012. 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Brazil/pdf.pdf 
 
2.2.2 THE IMPORTANT NEW OIL DISCOVERIES OF BRAZIL 
A new deep-water exploration discovery was announced in 2007 by Petrobras, the 
Brazilian national oil company. Tupi field is located in the Santa Basin, 155 miles off 
southern coast of Brazil. It has 5-8 billion barrels of oil. It is estimated to produce 1 
million b/d in 2012. Brazil’s plan is to invest $174 billion from 2009 to 2013 to help 
expand daily production through the development of Tupi field. Several discoveries 
followed after Tupi field was discovered, with total reserves estimated as 80 billion 
barrels of oil equivalent in the Santos Basin. This discovery will lead Brazil to be a major 
exporter and a potential member of OPEC in the coming years, and eventually Brazil 
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should be the primary Latin American oil supplier.  The Brazilian government’s interest 
in private ownership of oil reserves increased after the new oil discovery in 2007. The 
government withdrew 41 deep-water blocks in the Santos Basin from the ninth bidding 
round and held more offshore blocks in the tenth bedding round. The current discussion 
is about raising oil sales and associated taxes or changing the contacts from private 
contracts to production sharing with Petrobras. The feeling of nationalism has also 
increased since the new discovery. The government is thinking of creating a separate 
state-owned oil company to extract Tupi field oil (Voss, 2009). 
2.2.3 BRAZIL’S RESPONSE TO THE RESOURCE CURSE 
 
Brazil experienced a resource curse from the 1960s to the mid 1980s. The export-
to-GDP ratio remained at 8% throughout that period. High tariff and quotes were 
imposed on Brazil through the inward-looking development strategy by countries like 
Argentina and Mexico. This resulted in preventing Brazil from competing internationally. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a short-term boom because of the import-substitution 
strategy that focused on creating capital intensive growth in the manufacturing sector. 
This situation led to lack of demand for moderately skilled workers and did not create 
encouragement for education. It had a long-term negative impact on Brazil (Voss, 2009). 
 In a study about Brazil describing its resource curse in, (Voss, 2009, P42) explained: 
 
The protection of the domestic producers of tradable goods also reduced their 
international competitiveness. Since Brazilian firms did not need to compete 
internationally, the government and employers were less resistant to rent-seeking 
behavior by workers. This lack of market discipline in Brazilian labor market 
allowed the labor force to organize in order to seek high wage premiums. These 
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resource rents provided a financial basis for the organization of the working class. 
This inefficiently raised costs for the domestic producers of tradable goods. To 
compensate for the higher labor costs, many firms raised their domestic prices 
making them less competitive internationally. 
 
The oil industry is competitive in Brazil. The government changed its strategy 
after the curse. For the last 18 years, the government has pursued a trade liberalization 
policy, and the economy has become more open. Trade has increased considerably from 
14% of the GDP in 1988 to 30% of GDP in 2006 (Voss, 2009). Brazil has succeeded not 
only in production but also in exports. Whereas the annual rate of global exports 
increased by 8.5%, the annual rate of exports by Brazil has increased 22%. This new 
export strategy helps diversify exports of a variety of products, but oil exports still 
dominate. Figure 5 explains oil production and consumption in Brazil. 
Transparency is an essential focus in revenue management because it enables 
citizens to trust their governments and to know to what extent the government is using 
the revenue for the country’s economic growth and social programs.  The government of 
Brazil openly discloses information about its revenues and expenditures. For this 
purpose, the government’s website contains data for the public as well as about 
participation in the stock exchange. The public has had access to the webpage since 2004. 
Available information includes the federal government’s expenditures for purchases and 
service contracts for public projects. Brazil ranked first in 2010 for the government’s 
openness in oil, gas and mining management. Furthermore, transparency decreases the 
degree of corruption by the government and increases political stability (Revenue Watch 
Index, 2010).  
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Like the government, the partly state-owned oil and gas exploration and 
production company, Petrobras, is transparent; it follows accounting standards that are 
recognized internationally. Petrobras is publicly listed on the international stock 
exchange. Production reports and financial statements are submitted to the U.S. and 
Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commissions. Citizens can also have access to its 
financial data such as main taxes, royalties, special contributions, as well as its payments 
to the government of Brazil, through the Petrobras website on 
 http://www.petrobras.com.br/pt/ (Revenue Watch Institute).  
Voss (2009) summarized three reasons that Brazil might fall under the influence 
of the “natural resource curse” again: 
1- The oil exports from the Santos Basin will increase oil revenue; thus, Brazil might 
face Dutch Disease.  
2- The income “disparity” that causes unequal growth might increase rent-seeking 
behavior.  
3- The global demand for oil increases the instability of oil prices. 
In the meantime, Brazil is attempting to resist and prevent the natural resource curse, in 
spite of the above-mentioned possibilities. 
To avoid the resource curse, Brazil intends to create a stabilization fund similar to 
Norway’s.  This will help provide reserves for consistent expenditure during the boom- 
and-bust cycles. Shifting from importing substitution to trade liberalization creates 
competition in business and favors the development of an internal economy. 
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Privatization of Petrobras and investment in innovation and R&D promote transparency 
at the political and corporate levels. These measures of promoting transparency will 
decrease corruption. Diversification of exports reduces dependency on oil exports during 
boom-and-bust cycles that diminish the effect of the natural resource curse (Voss, 2009). 
In addition to the above, the government of Brazil has recently improved its fiscal 
management and monetary policy. This improvement can be seen in the following: 
economic growth, stabilization of the inflation rate, a decrease in public debt, and a 
slowdown in the exchange rate appreciation, and the implementation of a forward-
looking policy (Voss, 2009). 
Thus, Brazil faced the resource curse during the 1960s to mid 1980’s. It might fall 
into the curse again in the future after the new pre-salt discovery. But the Brazilian 
government is prepared and implements strategies, follows successful models, and 











Nigeria is a developing country that has been a member of OPEC since 1971.  
Nigeria is located in western Africa, bordering the Gulf of Guinea, between Benin and 
Cameroon, as shown in Figure 6. As the most populous country in Africa, Nigeria is 8
th
 



















Figure 6: Map of Nigeria. 
http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/nigeria.html 
Location: Western Africa  
Government type: Federal republic 
 
Area:  923,768 sq km 
 
Population: 152,217,341 
World population rank 8th  
 
Population below the poverty line: 70% 
Labor force: 48.33 million (2010 ) 
Literacy: 68% 
 
Infant mortality rate total: 92.99 deaths/ 
1,000 live births 
Global infant mortality rank:  10th  
  
Oil reserves: 37.5 billion bbl (2010) 
Global oil reserve rank: 10th  
 
Oil production: 2.211 million bbl/day 
(2009.) 





2.3.1 RESERVES, PRODUCTION, AND EXPORT 
Oil was discovered in the Niger delta in 1956. Today Nigeria has the second 
largest oil reserves in Africa. As of January 2010, Nigeria had 37.2 billion barrels of 
proven oil reserves, according to the Oil and Gas Journal. Furthermore, it is considered 
the largest oil producer in Africa. Oil production in 2009 was slightly more than 2.2 
million bbl/d. Nigeria receives wealth from oil exports as well. About 76% of 
government revenue comes from export. Nigeria is the fifth largest foreign oil supplier to 
the United States; in 2009 approximately 1.9 million bbl/d were exported from the total 
production (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2011). Figure 7 shows Nigeria’s 
oil Production, consumption and export/. 
 
 




2.3.2 NIGERIA’S RESPONSE TO THE RESOURCE CURSE 
 
At present, Nigeria’s economy is dependent on the oil sector, whereas agriculture 
was the dominant sector prior to the oil discovery. The oil boom increased the oil 
industry and revenue in 1970. This resulted in a decline in agricultural production, the 
immigration of laborers from rural to urban areas, and eventual food price increases. The 
GDP’s agriculture share declined from 68% to 35% between 1965 and 1981 (Voss, 
2009).  According to the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 
agriculture composed more than 40% of GDP. From the 1970’s to 1980’s the general 
agricultural output per capita, food specifically, declined as oil production exceeded 
agriculture compared to the period of 1969-1972, as shown in table 3. In comparison with 
the rest of the developing world, Nigeria’s agriculture and food production was lower in 











THE PERFORMANCE OF NIGERIAN AND DEVELOPING WORLD 
AGRICULTURE: 1969 - 83 
Index of Output per Capita 
 1969 - 72 1974 - 78 1979 - 81 1982 -83 
Nigeria     
  Agriculture 100 91 91 84 
   Food 100 92 92 85 
Developing World     
  Agriculture 100 103 105 104 
   Food 100 104 106 106 
Table 3: The performance of Nigeria and developing world agriculture: 1969-1983  
Source: Kinney, 2009. 
 Furthermore, the government failed to invest in the manufacturing sector. In an 
attempt to improve the economy, the government tried to spend oil revenue in the 
manufacturing sector, but there was not enough demand for manufactured products, and 
production did not increase. This resulted in a waste of the revenue; for example, the 
capacity utilization calculation for manufacturing (the level to the productive capacity of 
a country is used for the generation of goods, which was 77 percent in 1975, declined to 
50% in 1983 and has remained at 35% since the mid 1980’s. This shows how the 
government has wasted its investment in manufacturing and has failed to expand revenue 
for two decades. The failure to expand the large wealth from the oil boom and 
insufficient investment of revenue into manufacturing are characteristics of Dutch 
Disease (Voss, 2009). 
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Nigeria has experienced poor economic performance since its independence from 
Britain in 1960; corruption and mismanagement of the revenue can be factors for the 
slow economic performance. In 2003, Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian 
used several calculations to determine the economic performance of Nigeria. One of their 
calculations shows that the GDP per capita decreased from US$1,113 in 1970 to 
US$1,084 in 2000, placing Nigeria among the 15 poorest nations in the world. 
Furthermore, income distribution and poverty measurements show that the percentage of 
the population that has to survive on less than US$1 per day has increased from 36% to 
about 70%, as shown in figure 8. Thus, the number of poor increased from 1970, when 
the revenue was 19 million, to 2000, when the revenue was 90 million, as shown in figure 
9. Additionally, the plot of income distribution for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
shows a gap between rich and poor. The 2000 curve is different from the 1970 curve in 
that it shows a gap between the wealthy and poor as shown in figure 10. The study shows 
further that, due to the volatility of GDP growth, Nigeria’s economy was not stable. 
In short, Nigeria’s poor economic performance, Dutch Disease, wasting oil 
revenue, increasing poverty, and gap between rich and poor through time demonstrate 







Figure 8: Nigeria’s poverty rates increased from 36% in 1970 to approximately 70% in 
2000. Source: Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). 
 
Figure 9: Nigeria’s poverty count, showing that Nigeria’s number of poor increased from 
1970 to 2000. 






Figure 10: Nigeria’s income distribution from 1970 to 2000. 
 








CHAPTER 3:  IRAQ’S RESPONSE TO THE RESOURCE CURSE 
 
This chapter will examine Iraq’s situation before and after Saddam Hussein’s rule, 
the challenges of oil revenue management, and the damage of years of war to the 
petroleum sector. 
3.1 IRAQ 
Iraq is a developing country and the founding member of OPEC. Located in 
western Asia, Iraq borders Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
Persian Gulf between Iran and Kuwait. Iraq has an area of 438,317 sq km and a 
population of 30,399,572. Figure 11 shows a map of the Iraq and facts about it.
 
Figure 11: Map of Iraq.     
Source: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/iraq.html 
 
Location: Western Asia 
Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iran 
and Kuwait  
 
Government type: Parliamentary democracy 
Area:  438,317 sq km 
 
Population: 30,399,572 (2011) 
World population rank: 39th 
 
Population below the poverty line: 70% (2007) 
Labor force: 8.5 million (2009) 
Literacy: 74.1% 
 
Infant mortality rate total: 41.68 deaths/1,000 
 live births 
Global infant mortality rank:  61st   
 
Oil reserves: 115 billion bbl (2010) 
Global oil reserve rank: 4th  
Oil production: 2.399 million bbl/day (2009)  








Population: 29,671,605  
total: 438,317 sq km 
land: 437,367 sq km 
water: 950 sq km 
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3.1.1 RESERVES, PRODUCTION, AND EXPORT 
 
Iraq’s proven reserves rank it as fourth worldwide after Saudi Arabia, Canada, 
and Iran. A 2001 study shows that Iraq has 115 billion barrels of proven oil, but the 
reserves may be higher because the 2001 study was based on 2D seismic data from three 
decades ago. Furthermore, the unexplored western and southern parts of Iraq were 
estimated to have an additional 45 to 100 billion barrels. (Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 2010).  
Iraq’s oil resources are located in three main areas in the northern and southern 
parts of the country. The resources are mostly concentrated in Shiite areas in the south. 
The ethnically Kurdish area to the north is estimated to have 20% of the resources, and 
the Sunni area contains few resources. This unequal distribution creates confusion over 
rights to reserves between the Kurds and other groups. Accordingly, future development 
of Iraq’s oil sector will involve serious disputes (Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), 2010).  
Oil was discovered in the 1920’s. In 1979 Iraq produced 4 million b/d and 
became OPEC’s third largest producer after Iran and Saudi Arabia. Due to the 1990 Gulf 
War and the 2003 Kuwait invasion, oil production dramatically decreased, as shown in 
figure 12. In 2003, Iraq’s estimated production was 2.5 to 2.7 million b/d, but it actually 
produced 1.5 million b/d. Iraq produced 2.00 million b/d, in 2004 and 1.8 million b/d in 
2005. In 2006, production increased to 2.06 million b/d, but did not reach the projected 
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target of 2.5 million b/d (Jaffe, 2006). Oil production reached 2.4 million b/d in 2011, as 
shown in figure 13 (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2010). 
 
 
Figure 12:  Iraq’s oil production history from 1973 to 2005, showing dramatic declines 
due to war and sanctions. 
Source: Jaffe, 2006.  
 31 
 
Figure 13: Iraq’s production, export, and consumption of oil from 1990 to 2009. 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Full.html 
Iraq’s exports have faced challenges due to the chaos and unrest that started in 
2003. These challenges include the export disagreement between the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG), which is the official ruling body of the northern federated region, 
and the central government. Exports have declined but have started to rise again 
recently. In 2009, crude oil exports totaled 1.8 million bbl/d, and in February 2011 they 
reached 2.202 million b/d, the highest level since 2003 according to Reuters reports 
(Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Iraq business news, 2011). 
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In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report about Iraqi oil reserves, production, 
and potential revenue, Lawrence Kumins (2006) calculated the revenue from exports 
under different production situations and price scenarios. Table 4 shows the hypothetical 
revenues if the security and oil fields are improved. Under any circumstances, export 
revenue is considered to be huge. 
Table 4: Range of possible future Iraqi annual oil export revenue ($billion). 
Source:  Kumins, 2006. 
 
According to Hussein al-Shahristani, Iraq’s Oil Minister, Iraq’s oil export 
revenue constitutes 95% of the government’s revenue. He stated, “Iraq raised 171 
billion dollars from sales between 2006 and 2009, which accounted for all but 5% 
of the government's income during those years.” Shahristani said that oil raised $30 
billion in 2006, $40 billion in 2007, $60 billion in 2008, and $41 billion in 2009 
(Middle East online, 2010).  
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The production figures released by the Iraqi Oil Ministry from January 2010 
to January 2011 are shown in table 5. Exports in January 2010 were 1.92 million 
b/d and increased to 2.20 million b/d in February 2011, which is the highest level 
after Hussein’s regime fell in 2003. “As usual, the bulk of Iraq's production flowed 
to the southern port of Basra, where an average of 1.708 million barrels a day was 
pumped into tanker ships. The northern pipeline to Turkey exported an average of 
484,000 barrels a day. That included an average of 80,000 barrels a day from 
Kurdistan. An additional 10,000 barrels a day were trucked to Jordan. These 
achievements were largely the result of foreign oil deals signed in 2009” (Musings 
on Iraq, 2011).  
Month, Year 
Average production (million 
barrels per day) 
Jan. 2010 1.92 
Feb. 2010 2.05 
Mar.2010 1.84 
Apr. 2010 1.80 
May 2010 1.88 
Jun. 2010 1.86 
Jul. 2010 1.82 
Aug. 2010 1.82 
Sep. 2010 2.02 
Oct. 2010 1.91 
Nov. 2010 1.92 
Dec. 2010 1.95 
Jan. 2011 2.16 
Feb. 2011 2.20 
  
                Table 5: Iraqi oil exports, January 2010-February 2011.  
   Source: http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2011/03/blog-post.html 
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The Iraqi Oil Ministry also released the revenue figures. In January 2010 
revenue was $4.441 billion, which increased to $5.222 billion in December 2010, 
and increased further to $6.082 billion in January 2011, as shown in table 6. The 
global market instability resulted in a sharp rise in oil prices. The current Middle 
East political situation affects the global oil price; for instance, unrest in Libya 
decreased its oil production by half and caused a rise in oil prices (Musings on Iraq, 
2011).   
In 2011, Iraq’s production and oil revenue jumped for two reasons. First, 
increased export of Kurdistan oil after the central government allowed the Kurds to 
sell their oil; second, the recent political situation in Libya resulted in increased oil 


















      Table 6: Iraqi oil production and earnings, January 2010-January 2011 
     Source: http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2011/03/blog-post.html 
 
3.2 Iraq’s response to the resource curse during the Saddam Hussein 
Era 
During Saddam Hussein’s era, oil revenue was used for violent purposes; it 
funded the army and fueled years of war with neighbors. Not only did the years of war 
cost a huge amount of money, but also Iraq had to compensate Kuwait for years 
afterward. For instance oil money funded the army that Saddam Hussein used to occupy 










59.7  $4.441  $73.97  
Feb.   57.9  $4.229  $73.04  
Mar.   57.1  $4.351  $76.20  
Apr.  53.0  $4.222  $79.66  
May  58.7  $4.335  $73.85  
Jun.  54.7  $3.889  $71.10  
Jul.  56.3  $4.009  $71.21  
Aug.  55.4  $3.957  $71.43  
Sep.  60.6  $4.428  $73.07  
Oct.   58.7  $4.526  $77.10  
Nov.   57.3  $4.618  $80.59  
Dec.   60.5  $5.222  $86.31  
Jan. 
2011   
67.0  $6.082  $90.78  
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compensate Kuwait for the war damage. “5 [Five] percent of Iraq's oil and gas revenue 
is set aside into a fund to compensate Kuwait for damages, including some $130 billion 
in lost oil production, of which about $25 billion remains to be paid” (Bengali, 2010). 
This illustrates the problem of oil revenue being in the hands of the government that 
misuses it for violence; this is a characteristic of rent-seeking behavior. 
The Iraqi regime was corrupt, and the government controlled revenue and 
expenses. The budget remained secret; anyone who disclosed secrets was punished or 
killed. The Revenue Watch Institute website (Transperancy snapshot, March,2011) 
describes the revenue transparency as follows:  
Iraq is almost entirely dependent on oil and gas revenue to support state 
expenditures. The size and use of oil revenues was a jealously guarded secret 
during Iraq's years of authoritarian rule. The oil sector was nationalized in the 
1960s-1970s. Since then, oil was managed first by the state-owned Iraqi National 
Oil Company and, after the company's abolition in 1987, by the Ministry of Oil 
directly.  
Oil is exported by the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), a department 
of the Ministry of Oil. Until 1991, revenues were deposited directly in a special 
account at the Central Bank of Iraq.  
During the years of sanctions after the first Gulf War (1995-2003), Iraq's oil 
revenues had to be deposited at an escrow account at a designated international 
bank BNP Paribas, under the supervision of the UN Sanctions Committee. Iraqi 
oil revenues were subject to extensive abuse during the so-called Memorandum 
of Understanding years. It is estimated the government of Iraq alone was able to 
divert over US$20 billion away from the account through a vast network of 
intermediaries. United Nations staff were also implicated in abuses of Iraqi 
resources. Since Saddam Hussein's fall, all revenues from the export sales of 
petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas are deposited into the 
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) that was created under United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1483, dated 21 May 2003 and continued under 
UNSCR 1468. The DFI account is held by the Central Bank of Iraq at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).  
In the immediate aftermath of the Saddam Hussein's removal, the DFI was 
managed by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), until June 28, 
2004, when the CPA was disbanded. 
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Thus it was impossible for people to even think about asking the government 
about oil revenue. This is called a lack of transparency in oil revenue management.   
Saddam Hussein considered economic data a secret, but based on limited 
available data, the economic growth curve of Iraq shows a dramatic decline for the 
period of Saddam Hussein’s reign. In 1989 the GDP stood at $38 billion when measured 
in constant 2003 dollars. In 1990 the GDP dropped dramatically. From that time the 
GDP remained at less than 30% of the 1989 value until the time that Saddam Hussein 
accepted the United Nations resolutions that contained 986 terms and conditions. The 
GDP rose from 10.6 billion in 1996 to 33 billion in 2000, and then decreased to $29 
billion in 2001. Figure 14 shows the volatile trend of economic growth of Iraq from 
1989 to 2003 (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Iraq economic data, 2004). 
Iraq faced income inequality during Saddam Hussein’s rule. The GDP per capita 
in 1989 was $2304, which decreased to $938 in 1990. Then it remained in a range no 
higher than $507 from 1991 until 1996. Generally, Iraqi citizens lived on limited 
income. Figure 15 shows the trend of Iraq’s GDP per capita (Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), Iraq economic data, 2004). Compared to the economic growth curve of 
Norway, which was discussed in Chapter 2, Iraq’s economy did not grow as it should 
have given its oil wealth similar to Nigeria’s decline in economy and GDP.  Nigerian’s 
and Iraqi people remained poor for decades and had difficulty making a living, while 
Norway’s oil increased its GDP and improved the standard of living of its citizens after 
the oil discovery.  
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Figure 14: Economic growth trend of Iraq from 1989 to 2003. 
 Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/images/ch2_anxD_img01.jpg 
  
Figure 15: Iraq GDP in current prices. 
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html 
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In addition to wasting the oil revenue to fund the army and war, Saddam Hussein 
increased Iraq’s debt. During the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1989, Iraq spent $54.7 
billion on its army. Iraq’s payment of short-term debts to western creditors was 
estimated to be $35 to $45 billion at high interest rates. An estimated $35 billion was for 
military debt. Through the Paris Club, the former Soviet Union and Russia gave loans to 
Iraq. These loans were used to support the military programs during the 1980s. Figure 








The Arab Gulf States also offered loans to Iraq. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
United Arab Emirates provided $30-$40 billion. Saddam Hussein considered this money 
from the Arab countries as support for the sake of avoiding the spread of “radical Iranian 
fundamentalism,” whereas the Arab countries considered the given money a loan. Figure 
17 shows Iraq’s debt from Non-Paris Club creditors (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Iraq economic data, 2004). 
 
Figure 17: Iraq’s major creditors Non Paris Club. 
Source:  https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/images/ch2_anxD_img06.jpg 
Iraq faced a humanitarian crisis in addition to the two wars. In reaction to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations pronounced sanctions against Iraq within 4 
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days. Hans Graf von Sponeck, who has served in the United Nations for 23 years, 
described the sanctions against Iraq as “the most comprehensive economic and military 
sanction ever.” Although it was supposed to be lifted after 60 days following Iraq’s full 
compliance with its disarmament obligation, the economic sanction lasted until the 
US/UK-led invasion in March 2003. The decade of sanctions affected the Iraqi people 
and children specifically; they paid dearly for their government’s violent actions. 
Statistics show that 10.1% of Iraqi children were underfed and 22.9% were underweight 
during this period. After 1997, child mortality for children under 5 years of age rose 
from 100 to 131 deaths per 1000 live births. Furthermore, this sanction affected literacy, 
which decreased from 81% to 73.5%. This happened in Iraq, which was considered to 
have one of the highest per capita food availabilities in the Middle East prior to 1990. 
Iraq had a well-educated and wealthy population prior to Saddam Hussein’s rule, but as 
consequences of wars and sanctions, the population became poor and had only limited 
education (Sponeck, 2005). 
It can be concluded that Saddam Hussein’s rule from 1979 to 2003 was 
characterized by dictatorship, control and misuse of oil revenue by the government, and 
insufficient social projects. All these factors demonstrate rent-seeking behavior. 
Furthermore, Iraq experienced a lack of transparency in revenue management, a decline 
in standard of living, decreased GDP, economic and military sanctions, a high rate of 
child mortality, and a decline in literacy rate. These social and political factors all 
illustrate that the oil was not a blessing but rather a curse for one of the world’s oil-rich 
countries. So, The resource curse faced Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule.  
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3.3 Post Saddam Hussein Era:  Resource Curse? 
 
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq experienced a transitional 
period. The required transformation will take a long time. The former Interim Prime 
Minister, Iyad Allawi, on the occasion of the handover of sovereignty on 28 June 2004, 
stated, “The transformation from dictatorship to civil society is a major task likely to 
take many years.” The transition is not only political but also economic. In this case, 
Iraqi’s duties would be: “the immense task of rebuilding its institutions, its 
infrastructure, and the rule of law.” Another critical task involved the Iraqi people’s 
resolution of regional differences through conflict reconciliation. (UNHCR report, 
country of origin information, 2005).  
To deal with the above challenges, the Iraqi government should promote the 
rapid growth of its economy. The economy is an essential factor for the country’s 
political stability, security, reconstruction, and development programs. To accomplish 
this, the petroleum sector should be developed because it is a major share of the 
government’s revenue. Other sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, should be 
developed as well.   
Regarding agriculture, Iraq is now considered a major importer of agricultural 
products, in part because the agricultural sector is not performing well. Imported 
products in the past were wheat, rice, sugar, vegetable oil, and protein meals.  Fifty 
percent of those products were imported in 1980, but imports rose to 80-100% in 2002. 
This increase still affects the agricultural sector, which will need years to recover. Iraq 
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will continue to depend on agricultural imports for the coming years to supply its needs. 
(Schnepf, 2003) 
Because other sectors are performing poorly, Iraq’s revenue depends most 
heavily on the oil sector for its economy. Oil accounts for approximately 70% of GDP, 
services make up 22%, industry is less than 1.5%, and farming decreased from 35% of 
the GDP in 1970s to 6.5% after 2003. Compared to Norway, Iraq’s oil industry does not 
serve the other industries. Only 2% of Iraqis are employed in the oil sector; the other 
98% of employees work in other sectors. Business accounts for 30% of the GDP. This 
does not provide work opportunities for Iraqis. They depend on the private sector 
instead, which is very small (Education for Peace in Iraq, EPIC, 2009). Thus, Iraq is 
facing Dutch Disease again. 
Iraq’s infrastructure was negatively affected by years of war and sanctions. The 
Iraqi people believed that the infrastructure would improve after Saddam Hussein’s fall, 
but it got worse. Even now, there are serious troubles with water, sewer, power, and 
other key services.  For instance, electricity is in short supply in the country; the 
electrical generating and distribution system lacks maintenance and faced years of 
neglect. In January 2009, only about 51% of the population say they have enough 
electricity at least some of the time; only 25% are somewhat or very satisfied with the 
available electricity. Figure 18 provides an explanation by showing the supply and 






Figure 18: Supply and demand of electricity in Iraq. 
Source: (Cordesman, 2010). 
 
Regarding public services, water and sewage are problems as well. According to 
research by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) issued in August 2009 (Cordesman, 
2010, P.46):  
 
In April 2009, nearly 68% of Iraqi’s reported being able to get safe, clean 
drinking water at least some of the time, indicating no significant change from 
January 2009. Although the majority of Iraqis can get safe drinking water, only 
34 percent are satisfied with the availability of drinking water, a two point 
increase from January 2009. Only 46 percent of Iraqis state that they have a 
working sewage disposal system at least some of the time, down two percentage 
points from November 2007. The percentage of Iraqis satisfied with sewage 
disposal services is 29 percent, a three percent increase from January 2008. 
 
Another issue that is an obstacle for Iraq’s recovery is its debt. Iraq’s Paris Club 
debt relief now totals nearly $42.3 billion (80% of total Paris Club debt). Approximately 
 45 
$13 billion in debt relief from non-Paris Club countries and $20.9 billion in commercial 
debt relief was received as well. The remaining bilateral debt outstanding (including that 
owed to the Paris Club) is between $48.9 billion and $76.9 billion, according to the U.S. 
Treasury (Cordesman, 2010). 
3.3.1 Transparency in revenue management 
 
Following Saddam Hussein’s fall, there has been no transparency in oil 
management and no public awareness of the government’s revenue, economic data, 
payments, and expenditures. Iraq was ranked fifth from the bottom in the list of 180 
nations in terms of transparency. In January 2010 Reuters reported that “Iraq joined a 
global transparency initiative Sunday in a bid to heal its reputation as a nation plagued 
by corruption and misuse of its vast oil wealth.” (Reuters, Rasheed, 2010). This action 
will help increasing transparency in oil and gas revenue management, revealing the 
taxes and royalties that are paid to governments. 
3.3.2 Challenges to Revenue Management: Internal Conflict 
 
Iraq’s revenue management challenges are due to the political, legal and 
constitutional issues that Iraq is experiencing today. The roles and powers of federal, 
regional, and government authorities in the Iraqi constitution are unclear and vague.  
The power and the roles are divided among the national government, the Kurdistan 




Middle East Director Yahia Said, “The most continuous issue in the legal 
framework is the division of authority between the federal center and regions.” 
However, the concept of federalism is included in Iraqi constitution and law, but the 
Iraqi attitude toward oil sector legislation reflects regional differences regarding the 
authority of government to make decisions about revenues and oil policy (Blanchard, 
2009). This creates an additional challenge to managing oil revenue. 
At the same time, constitution Articles 111 and 112 state that Iraq’s natural 
resources are the property of “all the people of Iraq in all regions and governorates” and 
that “the federal government, with producing governorates and regional government,” 
shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields   These 
provisions were incorporated to promote agreement among Iraqis and to enable the 
adoption of the constitution (Blanchard, 2009). This ambiguity of Articles 111 and 112 
creates different interpretations among the Kurds, and the Sunni and Shiite Arabs. The 
Kurds prefer regional power, whereas Sunni and Shiite Arabs prefer central government 
control over the distribution and collection of revenue. Therefore, there is no 
comprehensive national oil legislation unless Iraqis reconcile internally. This conflict in 
government is characteristic of rent-seeking behavior. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Yahia Said, Director, Middle East and North Africa, Revenue Watch Institute, “Iraq Hydrocarbon Legal 
Framework” Statement Submitted to the House Subcommittees on the Middle East and south Asia and 
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, July 19, 2007. 
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3.3.3 War damage and its impact on the petroleum sector 
 
Aside from the social and political challenges to successful resource 
management in Iraq, other complicating factors result from war damage. The wars of 
1980, 1991, and 2003 in Iraq affected oil production, which resulted in several declines 
in the economy, as explained in figure 12.  
The wars affected not only oil production but also exports. Export routes were 
damaged and closed; for instance, the 1.65 million bbl/d pipelines to the south closed 
after the Persian Gulf War, and there are no plans to reopen them (Jaffe, 2006). 
Furthermore, since the 2003 invasion, pumping stations, pipeline webs, wells, refineries, 
and terminals have been major targets for terrorist attacks, and oil personnel have been 
killed. According to Iraq Pipeline Watch
2
, since April 2003 insurgents have targeted oil 
facilities more than 220 times.  
The war damage is overwhelming. Prior to formulating any investment plan or 
expected production potential, the oil infrastructure will need to be reconstructed and 
modernized, which will cost billions of dollars. These necessary budgetary and 
infrastructure limitations extend the time that this country will need to establish secure 
and stable condition for future projections on productivity estimates.  Therefore, there is 
considerable uncertainty about infrastructure repair and development. 
                                                 
2 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), Mar. 28, 2005. 
(http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm) 
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 Based on research that has been done to identify the resource curse, it can be 
concluded that Iraq has been in the resource curse for decades. Like Brazil, it might face 
another resource curse in the future, for the following reasons: 
1- The current estimated reserves of 115 billion barrels and future exploration using 
advanced technology might reveal more reserves, which will increase production 
and exports.  Eventually Iraq will receive significant income and revenue from 
exports. This energy boom in the oil sector will result in a temporary 
overvaluation of the local currency. Furthermore, Iraq is ignoring the other 
sectors and not promoting a diversified economy that includes agriculture and 
manufacturing. These factors will lead Iraq to face the Dutch Disease again. 
2- Current situations, including internal conflicts over power, the lack of a clear and 
unified hydrocarbon law, corruption, and insufficient social and development 
projects, mean that Iraq will face rent-seeking behavior again. 
3- Oil prices are not stable, and the demand changes globally. In the past, a single 
political decision, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, affected the oil price all 
over the world. Current political situations in the Middle East, such as Libya, and 
the natural disaster (tsunami) in Japan have influenced the global market. The 
future is unknown and the situation is critical. Thus, the government could create 
programs for saving money from the oil revenue for the future, in case of 
decreasing oil price or unknown crises.  
4- The lack of transparency and failure to use an advanced accounting system may 
cause Iraq to experience continuation of the resource curse. 
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5- Declines or slow improvement in social aspects such as deteriorating life 
expectancy, high infant mortality, and a high poverty rate (70% in 2009) will 
cause Iraq to continue to suffer the resource curse, if there are no rapid changes 
in these factors.
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CHAPTER 4: AVOIDING THE RESOURCE CURSE 
 
Political stability greatly influences any country’s experience of the resource 
curse. In post-conflict environments like Iraq, it is not easy to avoid the resource curse. 
Sventlana Taslik, who is the director of the Open Society Institute’s Revenue Watch, 
stated, “The challenges of avoiding the resource curse in Iraq will be doubly difficult.” 
The government should be able to manage its oil or gas revenue fairly and to gain 
the trust of its citizens. Le Billion (2008) stated that “The task of revenue mobilization, 
budget allocation, and expenditure management are bound together by political 
imperatives as well as economic logic. To collect revenues, the state must be seen as 
legitimate in the eyes of its citizens.” Iraqis must develop political legitimacy and 
transparency in oil revenue expenditure through open budgetary and legislative 
processes.  
Detailed studies and research are needed to evaluate successful models from other 
countries that best suit a particular country. In the previous chapters, Norway is discussed 
as an example of an oil-abundant country that avoided the resource curse. Transparency 
should be the starting point. Transparency reduces corruption and the ability of an 
authorized government elite to control and appropriate the revenue. Thus, Iraq can follow 
Norway’s successful strategy.  
Another successful strategy of Norway is the stabilization of funds or sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF), the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, which comes from oil 
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revenue. Many countries depend on SWFs to increase revenue and investment, as shown 
in table 7.  
For the benefit of the citizens, there should be a direct distribution of revenue to 
the population. The Alaska model PFD Program (The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend 
Program) is another example of a successful model to follow. It is “a method for 
returning a portion of the revenues from petroleum development to the citizens of Alaska 
as a direct cash payment.” This amount is equally distributed to rich and poor citizens 
(Goldsmith, 2001). 
Another strategy is economic diversification like that in Brazil , based on a wide 
range of profitable sectors. A diversified economy reduces economic instability, increases 
real activity performance, and promotes a sustainable, growing economy. All these 
factors will develop the stable political climate that Iraq requires. 
Iraqis should agree internally on a comprehensive and clear Hydrocarbon Law 
that defines rights and a fair revenue division. The central and regional roles in the 
revenue collection should be clear, and the wealth should truly belong to the Iraqis, as 
stated in the law. 
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 Table 7: List of the major SWFs worldwide, including estimates of the values of assets 
they manage as reported by public sources, as well as the respective year of 
inception and the source from which their funds are reported to be drawn. 
Source: Kern, 2007. 
 53 
  
Iraq should create a market-friendly environment to attract foreign companies to 
invest their money in the country. A relationship should be developed with foreign 
companies to expand Iraq’s role in the international market. This can be achieved by 
improving investment law and developing a more realistic picture about how an 
internationally competitive bidding system will work (Cordesman, 2010). Foreign 
companies will be eager to invest in country if the security and safeguards are provided to 
prevent diversion of oil and refined products. 
Iraq should take immediate action to provide good public service. Citizens are 
protesting in different parts of Iraq demanding their rights. One of these requirements is 
good public service. One of 1000 protesters, Ali Hassan, a resident of Diayala, which is 
15 miles northeast of Baghdad, said, "Our children have many diseases because of 
sewage problems and accumulated trash in the area.” (Abdul-kadir, The Seattle Times, 
2011). This is a simple example of poor public service by a government that should be 
able to provide for the basic human needs of its citizens. 
The current government should introduce strategies of revenue management, and 
train experts and provide advanced training to management staff. 
With the financial resources provided by oil revenue, the government should 
improve the overall quality and capacity of services for its citizens including 
educational systems and health programs. People had their share of years of wars 
and sanctions. If their living condition does not improve the people will not accept 
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the government’s authority. Iraqis have now lived seven years without a dictator; 
they will continue to seek additional freedom and the benefits of a wealthy country. 
The inspiring wave from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is likely to encourage Iraqis to 
















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
Many oil-rich countries suffer from poverty, corruption in their government, 
dictatorship, Dutch Disease; rent-seeking behavior, high rate of infant mortality, and 
low rate of transparency in the government and oil revenue management. These 
countries fall into the natural resource curse. However, it is possible for an oil-rich 
country to escape the resource curse and turn oil into a blessing to its nation.  
Norway did not fall into the resource curse after the oil discovery, because its 
leaders used effective strategies, economic diversification, social plans, stabilization 
funds, and transparency in oil management.  
Brazil was challenged by the resource curse but then started to grow 
economically, used trade liberalization strategies, and followed successful models 
like those in Norway to promote their oil revenue management. However, the new 
oil discoveries may cause Brazil to face the resource curse again. The Brazilian 
government is attempting to resist the possible resource curse by stabilizing the 
inflation rate, decreasing public debt, and implementing forward-looking strategies.  
Nigeria and Iraq are victims of the resource curse; they have both 
experienced poor economic growth, dictatorship, waste of oil revenue by ruling 
officials, and an increased poverty rate.  
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In Iraq, the curse started when Saddam Hussein took over in 1979. The 
country experienced wars, poverty, and sanctions, and the country is in debt. After 
Saddam Hussein’s reign, the country remains in the resource curse. The problems of 
the country include insecurity, lack of transparency in revenue management, lack of 
public services and war damage that affected the petroleum sector. Therefore, Iraq 
has not grown economically like Norway has, and it remains in the curse like 
Nigeria. The country stepped back instead of developing and competing with the 
advanced oil rich countries like Canada and the U.S.A. 
Iraq’s 115 billion barrels of reserves cause it to rank 4th in the world. As did the 
new oil discoveries in Brazil, this oil wealth might create a sudden boom in Iraq and 
cause it to continue to be in a resource curse. So, the question is, will Iraq escape the 
resource curse? This will be a challenging task for the Iraqi government while the country 
is in a transitional period from dictatorship to democracy. 
Oil-rich countries that have unstable political situations tend to be cursed like 
Iraq, Nigeria, and Brazil for a period of time. One of the reasons that Norway escaped the 
curse is because of its stable political situation and lack of conflict. The way for Iraq to 
escape the recourse curse is to: 
 Establish political stability as soon as possible. 
 Gain its citizens’ trust and be legitimate in their eyes by fair and transparent 
revenue management. 
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 Follow successful models like Norway or even compete globally and follow 
strategies that countries like the U.S.A. and Canada use. 
 Resolve internal conflict and pass a new comprehensive hydrocarbon law that 
defines the rights and authorities of the majority and minority groups. 
 Diversify the economy and revive agriculture and manufacturing sectors. 
 Create employment opportunities. 
 Create a market-friendly environment to attract foreign investment and maintain 
security in the country. 
 Provide public services and improve educational systems and health programs.  
 Improve overall quality of the governmental institutions and provide advanced 
training to the staff. 
This is a long list of difficult tasks, but if the government fails to take action and provide 
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